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1 October 2010 
he EU hoped to get the new diplomatic season off to a flying start by proposing a resolution 
(reproduced in Annex 1) to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that would give the EU, 
post-Lisbon, enhanced participation rights and transform its status from that of a multitude of 
ordinary observers to an observer with virtually full participation rights, able to make pronouncements and 
proposals and so on. This would have permitted Herman Van Rompuy to address the Assembly soon in a 
manner equal to his function as President of the European Council. The initiative failed when tabled on 
September 12-13
th, and in so doing raises a much broader and more fundamental issue for the EU’s foreign 
policy.  
The EU had hoped to get its resolution accepted by consensus. Instead a counter-resolution was presented for 
the EU’s resolution to be deferred and not put to the vote. The counter-resolution passed by 76 votes to 71, 
with 26 abstentions.
1 Since the 76 included most of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific beneficiaries of EU 
aid, something seems to have gone badly wrong. Only the Europeans (with the exception of Russia) voted en 
masse for the EU position. In any event the initiative is still grounded. The objections seem mainly to have 
been on matters of diplomatic process rather than substance, so the chances are that it may pass in due course 
when tabled again after more thorough consultations. Still, this is at the very least a warning to the EU that it 
cannot take broad majority support in the UN for granted.  
The UNGA set-back is just the tip of the iceberg, however. Also ongoing are negotiations to revise the 
governance of the IMF’s Executive Board, with pressure from the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
and developing countries to be more strongly represented in seats and votes, and with Europe presumed to 
make the compensating concessions. The EU or eurozone should surely be strongly represented at the IMF, 
but with a single seat, whereas today the European Central Bank has no more than partial observer status. 
                                                      
1 Interestingly, from the voting record on the resolution, no very strict voting patterns are discernable among the 
members of the G-77 developing countries (72 votes in favour, 20 against, and 20 abstentions), nor among the members 
of Non-Aligned Movement (59 votes in favour, 15 against, and 16 abstentions), nor among the members of the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (30 votes in favour, 9 against, and 7 abstentions). See Annex 2 for more details. 
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The US has proposed that the Board slim down from 24 to 20 seats, with the smaller EU member states in 
the firing line. With the European side not yet responding, the US now plays hard ball with the Europeans, 
since in the absence of agreement IMF rules of procedure will have the Executive Board revert automatically 
to 20 seats in any case. But the further turn of the screw here is that these rules require that the countries with 
the smallest number of votes on the Board are ejected, which would mean Brazil, India, Argentina and a 
constituency of francophone African states.  
The European problems go further still. According to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, the five top 
Board seats go the countries with the highest quota, which at present are the US (19.74%), Japan (6.01%), 
Germany (5.87%), France (4.85%) and the UK (also 4.85%), with China still lagging behind in sixth place 
(3.65%). China will obviously soon accede to a place among the top five, with France or the UK having to 
make room. At this point the logical solution would be for the eurozone to take over the seats of Germany 
and France, as well as of the other eurozone member states in other constituencies, which would trigger a 
useful reform of the constituency system more generally.  
The time horizon for this cannot be too far away, so Germany, France with the EU and eurozone should take 
a lead now, rather than lose control of the agenda amid mounting anti-European pressures from the rest of 
the world. For example, on September 24
th the Brazilian executive director published an article in the 
Financial Times blaming Europe for blocking reform of the IMF.
2 At the World Bank it is only a slightly 
different story. There were some minor changes in voting weights made in 2010, but the constituencies are 
not changed, and the EU, as the world’s leading donor bloc, is not even present as observer in its Executive 
Board.   
There is still more cause for concern. The EU is party to a great many (no less than 249) multilateral treaties, 
but in most cases this is alongside the presence of the EU member states which are also parties, because the 
treaty touches areas of ‘shared competence’. How must the EU be represented in meetings concerning these 
treaties, after Lisbon? And how must it be represented when new negotiations for multilateral agreements 
touching on shared competences are conducted? The protracted internal discussions to ensure EU 
representation at the Stockholm meeting in June of this year about a new multilateral treaty on phasing out 
the use of mercury has seen a stand-off between the Commission and Council, which apparently will have to 
be fought out before the European Court of Justice. The impasse led to the rather stunning statement by the 
Commission in Stockholm that due to the absence of “formal authorisation to negotiate”, the EU and its 
member states would be unable to engage in negotiations. Meanwhile there is no sign that the lessons of the 
disastrous Copenhagen climate change summit of December 2009 have been digested. The next summit in 
this series, in Cancun this December, promises to see the same confusion of EU and member state presences 
and representation. 
Some might suppose that these legal-institutional questions could be left to evolve gradually over years and 
decades. Indeed, the millstones of international and European law grind surely but slowly. But this attitude is 
no longer feasible. World events are now confronting the EU urgently with the need to face up to new 
realities, or – as our American friends say with blunt clarity – slide into irrelevance in global affairs. 
The three examples – Copenhagen, UNGA and IMF – illustrate perfectly the triple tensions at play. The EU 
strives for higher status in world affairs, corresponding to the development of EU competences. The BRICs 
want more power, and complain about EU member state overrepresentation. The EU member states are 
under pressure to cede seats and votes, but are unwilling to cede their national seats to a single EU seat. 
Meanwhile, the US bypasses the EU and the BRICS and developing countries block the EU. The result is 
impasse, with a sizeable portion of the blame aimed at the EU and its member states together. This is not 
how it was meant to be: rather, the EU was to be the world’s best friend of enlightened multilateralism. The 
imbroglio is going to get worse unless the EU does two things. 
First, and fundamentally, it has to engage in a comprehensive and strategic review of how it should position 
itself in the multilateral system, notably as regards the distribution of roles between the EU itself and the 
member states. Up to now, it has been going along with the EU adding a seat to the world’s top tables, with 
increasing hybrid presences, some of which work perfectly well (e.g. at the WTO). But this approach is 
running out of credit, as the BRICs and developing countries push for reduced European representation, and 
without this, refuse additional EU presence. This is a highly complex legal and political task. A basic review 
should be set into motion now by the European Council at a next summit meeting of the type just held on 
                                                      
2 P. Noguira Batista, “Europe must make way for a modern IMF”, Financial Times, 24 September 2010. The EU’s Diplomatic Debacle at the UN | 3 
September 16
th, and undertaken by the new External Action Service and Commission. The EU and its 
member states will need to work out a proper strategic plan, and provide for trade-offs between them (more 
EU and fewer member states) and between the various international fora (gain ground here, cede seats there).  
Second, and as and when the EU has worked out its strategy, it must do its diplomatic homework better. 
More communication and lobbying by the EU and its member states, working together with the world’s 192 
UN member states as well as the G20, is indispensable. It is too costly for the reputation and credibility of 
the EU to go to the UNGA and be surprised when its proposal, intended for consensus, is shot down by the 
very states that are its main aid beneficiaries. This is particularly so because the EU is actually in a position 
to build consensus through measured diplomatic effort. After all, the debacle at the UNGA came just days 
after the EU scored a major diplomatic success in that very same forum without its own vote, when the 
UNGA passed the resolution the EU had worked out with Serbia on Kosovo. 4 | Emerson & Wouters 
Annex 1. Draft Resolution A/64/L67 of the UN General Assembly – 
Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations 
 
The General Assembly,  
Bearing in mind the role and authority of the General Assembly as a principal organ of the United Nations and the 
importance of its effectiveness and efficiency in fulfilling its functions under the UN Charter, 
Recognizing, further, that the current interdependent international environment requires the strengthening of the 
multilateral system in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and then principles of 
international law,  
Acknowledging that, when an organisation for regional integration develops common external policies and 
establishes permanent structures for their conduct and representation, the General Assembly may benefit from the 
effective participation in its deliberations of that organisation’s external representatives speaking on behalf of the 
organisation and its member states, without prejudice to the ability of each organisation to define the modalities of 
its external representation,  
Recalling the long standing relations between the European Union and the United Nations, 
Noting the entry into force on 1 December 2009 of the Treaty of Lisbon, through which the European Union has 
made changes to its institutional system, in particular as regards its external representation, 
Noting that in the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union reaffirms inter alia its commitment to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations Charter and to the promotion of multilateral solutions to common problems, in 
particular in the framework of the United Nations,     
Noting also that under the Treaty of Lisbon, the Member States of the European Union have entrusted the external 
representation of the European Union, with regard to the exercise of the competences of the European Union 
provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon, to the following institutional representatives: the President of the European 
Council; the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; and the 
European Commission and European Union Delegations, 
Noting  that  the representatives of the European Union referred to above have assumed the role, previously 
performed by the representatives of the Member State holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union, of acting on behalf of the European Union at the UN in the exercise of the competences 
conferred by its member states, 
Recalling that, by virtue of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union has replaced the European Community, as 
notified to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by a letter dated 30 November 2009 
Noting that the European Union is a party to many instruments concluded under the auspices of the United 
Nations, is a member of several United Nations specialised agencies and is a full participant in several United 
Nations bodies, 
Noting that the European Union retains observer status in the General Assembly 
1. Decides that the representatives of the European Union for the purpose of participating effectively in the 
sessions and work of the General Assembly, including in the general debate, and its committees and working 
groups, in international meetings and conferences convened under the auspices of the Assembly, as well as in 
United Nations conferences, and in order to present positions of the European Union, shall be invited to speak in a 
timely manner, similar to the established practice for representatives of major groups, without prejudice to the 
intergovernmental nature of the United Nations, shall be permitted to circulate documents, to make proposals and 
submit amendments, the right to raise points of order, but not to challenge decisions of the presiding officer, and 
to exercise the right of reply, and be afforded seating arrangements which are adequate for the exercise of the 
aforementioned actions; the European Union shall not have the right to vote or to put forward candidates in the 
General Assembly; 
2. Decides that when a regional organisation representing Member States has reached a level of integration that 
enables that organisation to speak with one voice, the General assembly my adopt modalities, in the spirit of this 
resolution, for the participation in its deliberations of that organisation’s external representatives speaking on 
behalf of the organisation and its Member States;  
3. Requests the Secretary-General to take any measures necessary to ensure the implementation of this decision. 
[Note: this includes the amendments made by the European Union on 13 September 2010 to its initial text].  The EU’s Diplomatic Debacle at the UN | 5 
Annex 2. Votes on motion to adjourn the debate of participation of the EU 
in the UN General Assembly, 14 September 2010 
Regions Yes  No  Abstain 
Africa  Algeria            Eritrea         Somalia       
Angola            Ethiopia       South Africa 
Benin              Ghana          Sudan 
Botswana        Kenya          Togo 
Burkina Faso  Lesotho        Uganda 
Chad               Libya           Tanzania 
Comoros         Mali             Zambia  
Congo             Mauritania   Zimbabwe 
Côte D’Ivoire  Mozambique 
Djibouti          Namibia 
Equatorial-      Nigeria 
Guinea            Seychelles 
Liberia        Morocco 
Malawi       Tunisia 
Burundi                Gambia 
Cameroon             Rwanda 
Central African-   Senegal 
Republic 
Democratic- 
Republic of Congo 
Americas  Antigua          Ecuador       St Knitts-Levis 
Barbuda         El Salvador  St Lucia 
Barbados        Grenada      St Vincent-Gren 
Belize            Guyana        Suriname 
Bolivia           Haiti           Trinidad-Tobago 
Cuba              Jamaica        Venezuela 
Dominica      Nicaragua 
Chile          Panama 
Colombia   Paraguay 
Costa Rica Peru 
Guatemala United States 
Mexico      Uruguay 
Argentina    Dominican-    
Brazil           Rep. 
Canada        Honduras 
Asia  China            Philippines 
DPR Korea   Singapore 
India             Thailand 
Indonesia      Turkmenistan 
Malaysia 
Afghanistan   Rep. of Korea 
Bangladesh   Timór Leste 
Cambodia     Uzbekistan 
Kazakhstan 
Armenia      Pakistan 
Bhutan        Sri Lanka    
Brunei Darussalam 
Mongolia 
Nepal 
Europe  Russian Federation  Albania    Germany      Norway  United- 
Andorra   Greece          Poland    Kingdom 
Austria     Hungary       Portugal 
Belgium   Iceland         Rep. of- 
Bosnia and Herz.          Moldova 
Bulgaria   Ireland          Romania 
Croatia     Italy              San Marino 
Cyprus     Latvia            Serbia 
Czech Rep. Liechtenstein Slovakia 
Denmark  Lithuania       Slovenia   
Estonia     Luxembourg  Spain 
Finland     Malta             Sweden  
FYROM  Monaco          Switzerland 
France      Montenegro   Turkey 
Georgia    Netherlands   Ukraine 
Belarus 
Middle 
East 
Bahrain      Qatar 
Iran            Saudi Arabia 
Iraq            Syria 
Kuwait       Yemen 
Lebanon 
Israel       Jordan  Oman            UA Emirates 
Oceania  Fiji            Nauru 
Marshall-  Palau 
Islands      Solomon Islands 
Micronesia 
Papua N-  Tuvalu 
Guinea 
Tonga 
 
Australia        Samoa 
New Zealand 
Total  76 71  26 
 